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I. Introduction
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is one of the oldest, most ambitious, and
most universal arms control treaties ever to enter into force.' At present 189 countries are
Parties to the NPT.2 The supporters of the NPT claim that it is one of the most successful
multilateral treaties in history. When the NPT was originally signed, five countries had a
nuclear weapon capability. Now, forty years later, only nine countries (give or take) have
developed nuclear weapons.' Many countries that are capable of developing a capability
(such as Japan or Germany) have chosen not to do so. Several countries, most notably
South Africa, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus have voluntarily given up their nuclear
weapons.4
While a strong argument can be made that the NPT has been successful in its mission to
deter proliferation of nuclear weapons, critics can point to several shortcomings. The NPT
has been criticized as being inequitable and further emphasizing the dichotomy between
the Nuclear Weapons States (generally richer, military Superpowers), and the Non-Nuclear
Weapons States (generally poorer, third-world countries with little international influ-
ence).5 Critics would also point to the failure of the NPT to prevent countries such as North
Korea, Pakistan, India, and Israel from developing weapons. These failures also bring into
question the ability of the NPT to discourage countries with nuclear aspirations (e.g., Iran,
Saddam-era Iraq) from becoming the next generation of Nuclear Weapons States.
In three important ways, the world of 2011 is much different than the world of 1968,
when the NPT was originally opened for signature. First, the development and use of wea-
pons of mass destruction has become less acceptable to the world community. Second, the
public opinion on the use of nuclear technology has become less favorable because of safe-
ty and environmental concerns. Third, the world approaches the development of treaties
differently. Some parts of the NPT, such as the right of countries to the benefits of "peaceful
nuclear explosions" are outdated. 6 It may be possible to develop a new, second-generation
NPT that incorporates the lessons learned from the failures of the original, and also adds
successful strategies gleaned from more recent multi-lateral treaties.
The NPT should be amended in several ways. First, it should do more to encourage Nuc-
lear Weapon State Parties to disarm. Second, it should include a 'no first use' provision.
Third, it should do more to encourage non-signatories to join. Fourth, it should do more to
discourage Parties from withdrawing from the treaty. Finally, it should do a better job of
balancing the rights of Non-Nuclear Weapon State Parties to develop nuclear technology
1. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161,
available at http://www.un.org/events/npt2005/npttreaty.html [hereinafter NPT).
2. Background: The Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, THE GUARDIAN, Apr. 5 2009,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/apr/05/nuclear-non-proliferation-treaty.
3. Status of Nuclear Powers and Their Nuclear Capabilities, GLOBALSECURITY.ORG,
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/summary.htm (last accessed Apr. 12, 2011).
4. Nuclear Forces Guide, FED. OF AM. SCIENTISTS, http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/ (last accessed Apr. 12,
2011).
5. See, e.g., Selig Harrison, How to Regulate Nuclear Weapons, WASH. POST, Apr. 23, 2006, at B7, available
at http://www.washingtonpostcom/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/04/21/AR2006042101627.html.
6. NPT, supra note 1, art. V.
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with dual-use concerns. This new NPT could provide a more equitable and effective solu-
tion to the complex dangers of nuclear weapons proliferation.
II. The Development of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
At the height of the "Cold War," it was recognized that the deterrent balance between
the United States and U.S.S.R. would become increasingly unstable as more and more coun-
tries began to develop nuclear weapons capabilities. Miscalculation, unauthorized use, and
escalation could have far greater consequences for a nuclear-armed combatant than for
one without nuclear weapons. As a response to the perceived threats of proliferation, the
NPT was first proposed in 1958 by the government of Ireland.7
The NPT was initially drafted by the United States and the U.S.S.R. as part of their gener-
al bilateral arms control discussions.8 At the time neither country was willing to completely
disarm while both countries were concerned about nuclear proliferation.9 In addition,
three other countries (U.K., France, China) had developed nuclear weapons.10 The final ver-
sion of the NPT came to a compromise in which the five countries currently in possession
of nuclear weapons would sign as Nuclear Weapons States (NWS Parties) and be allowed
to keep their nuclear weapons (albeit with a promise of eventual disarmament), while all
other countries would sign as Non-Nuclear Weapons States (NNWS Parties).11 Article IX
specifies that no other countries will be allowed to accede to the NPT as NWS Parties, the-
reby permanently capping the number of NWS Parties at five.12
III. The Pillars of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
The NPT is commonly described as having three main "pillars": non-proliferation, dis-
armament, and peaceful use.13 The non-proliferation pillar is described in Articles 1-111.
Under this pillar, NNWS Parties agree not to import, build or otherwise acquire nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.14 NWS Parties are obliged not to transfer nuc-
lear weapons or explosive devices to other countries.'s In addition, any group of countries
is permitted to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones in its respective territories.1 6
Article VI describes the disarmament pillar and obliges the Parties to undertake "to pur-
sue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear
arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and
complete disarmament under strict and effective international control."' 7 While this Article
7. COlT D. BLACKER & GLORIA DUFFY, INTERNATIONAL ARMS CONTROL: ISSUES AND AGREEMENTS 153 (1984).
8. Id. at 153-56.
9. Id.
10. NPT, supra note 1.
11. Id. art. IX § 3.
12. Id.
13. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, FOREIGN AFF. AND INT'L TRADE CAN.,
http://www.international.gc.ca/arms-armes/nuclear-nucleaire/npt-tnp.aspx (last accessed Apr. 12,
2011).
14. NPT, supra note 1, arts. I-I1
15. Id.
16. Id. art. VII.
17. ld. art. VI.
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is only a vague statement with no hard deadlines or timetables, it remains the only legally
binding obligation on NWS Parties to ultimately eliminate their nuclear weapons. Although
few practical steps have been taken towards complete disarmament, at the 2000 NPT Re-
view Conference, the five NWS Parties agreed to "13 practical steps," including entry into
force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the reduction of the role of nuclear wea-
pons in strategic planning, leading to the elimination of their nuclear arsenals.18
Finally, as an incentive to get countries to sign as NNWSs, the peaceful uses pillar was
included in the treaty. Under this pillar, as described in Articles IV and V, all State Parties to
the treaty agree to full exchanges of equipment, materials and scientific and technological
information for peaceful uses of nuclear energy.19 NNWS Parties must accept and comply
with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards as a condition for peaceful
nuclear cooperation. 20 However, if NNWS Parties meet IAEA safeguards, there is no limit
on the countries' ability to "develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for
peaceful purposes without discrimination." 21
IV. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was a Success
If one considers that the main purpose of the NPT is to deter proliferation, then the
small number of new nuclear powers would imply the treaty was a success. When the NPT
was signed, five countries had nuclear weapons. 22 Now, forty years later, only nine coun-
tries (give or take) possess nuclear weapons. 23 This is much lower than some historical
predictions made at the time the NPT was being negotiated. For example, in 1963, Presi-
dent Kennedy warned that fifteen to twenty-five states might obtain military nuclear capa-
bilities by the 1970's.24 President Kennedy based this pessimistic forecast on a secret study
that Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara had given the president one month earlier. In
this document, McNamara expected that by 1973 eight new states might acquire nuclear
weapons (China, Sweden, India, Australia, Japan, South Africa, Germany, and Israel) and
that, shortly thereafter many more countries could go nuclear as the cost of acquiring nuc-
lear weapons "may come down by a factor of 2 to 5 times."25 In 2004, the IAEA estimated
that the number of countries with the know-how to develop nuclear weapons is in the
range of thirty-five to forty. 26 The fact that very few of these countries have chosen to de-
velop nuclear weapons shows that non-proliferation efforts have been successful.
In addition, the fact that the Ukraine voluntarily disarmed after the breakup of the
18. 2000 NPT Review Conference Final Document, ARMS CONTROL ASS'N,
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2000_06/docjun (last accessed June 26, 2011).
19. NPT, supra note 1, arts. IV-V.
20. ld. art. 11.
21. Id. art. IV.
22. Status of Nuclear Powers and Their Nuclear Capabilities, supra note 3.
23. Id.
24. John F. Kennedy, The President's News Conference of March 21, 1963, 1963 PUB. PAPERS 273, 273-74
(1964).
25. Memorandum from Robert McNamara, U.S. Sec'y of Def., to President John F. Kennedy (Feb. 12 1963),
available at http://www.fas.org/man/eprint/dodl963.pdf.
26. Mohammed El Baradei, Preserving the Non-Proliferation Treaty, 4 DISARMAMENT FORUM 5 (2004),
available at http://www.unidir.org/pdf/articles/pdf-art2185.pdf.
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U.S.S.R. is more evidence of success. Upon dissolution, Ukraine inherited 1240 nuclear
warheads as well as ICBMs and strategic bomber delivery systems, the third largest arsenal
in the world at the time.27 Within five years, Ukraine had successfully transferred all of
their weapons back to Russia, and joined the NPT as a NNWS Party.28 Both Kazakhstan and
Belarus also chose to give up their inherited nuclear capabilities and sign the NPT as NNWS
Parties.29 While other factors such as bilateral pressure, development costs, security guar-
antees from the United States, and domestic political pressure could be the reason coun-
tries such as Ukraine make the decision to disarm, a desire to be compliant with the NPT
and be accepted into the community of nations was certainly a factor in their decision-
making process. 30
There have also been successes in the disarmament pillar. Specifically, Article VI calls on
Parties to the treaty to "undertake[ to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective meas-
ures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disar-
mament."31 Since the NPT entered into force, there have been numerous treaties and nego-
tiations related to the reduction of the nuclear threat.32 When the NPT was signed in 1968
there were approximately 39,000 nuclear weapons in the world. By 2006, worldwide nuc-
lear stockpiles had shrunk to less than 27,000.33 While this is only a small step towards the
complete disarmament Article VI calls for, it does represent a considerable success. The
three smaller nuclear powers (U.K., France, China) have also slowly reduced their stock-
piles from their peak levels, and now each retains only around half the number of war-
heads they have in the past.34 While none have taken any concrete actions towards com-
plete disarmament, all the NWS Parties are moving towards smaller stockpiles.
The peaceful uses pillar has been the least successful of the three pillars. In the last dec-
ade, the growth rate of worldwide nuclear energy generation capacity has only been 0.6%
per year.35 However, this lack of growth can be attributed to the economic costs of nuclear
27. Ukraine Profile: Nuclear Overview, NUCLEAR THREAT INITIATIVE,
http://www.nti.org/e-research/profiles/Ukraine/Nuclear/index.html (last accessed Apr. 12, 2011);
Robert S. Norris & Hans M. Kristensen, Global Nuclear Stockpiles, 1945-2006, 62 BULL. ATOMIC
SCIENTISTS 64 (Jul.-Aug. 2006).
28. Norris & Kristensen, supra note 27.
29. Id.
30. See Mark Kramer, Neorealism, Nuclear Proliferation, and East-Central European Strategies, in UNIPOLAR
POLITICS: REALISM AND STATE STRATEGIES AFTER THE COLD WAR 417-20 (Ethan B. Kapstein & Michael
Mastanduno eds., 1999).
31. NPT, supra note 1, art. VI.
32. See, e.g., the U.S.-U.S.S.R. bilateral Strategic Arms Litigation Talks ("SALT I" and "SALT 1l"), see also
Links, THE COLD WAR MUSEUM, http://www.coldwar.org/articles/70s/links.asp (last accessed Apr. 12,
2011); START Treaties, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE,
http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/starthtm/start.html (last accessed Apr. 12, 2011) (the
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty series between the United States and the U.S.S.R. (and subsequently
with Russia); Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems ("ABM"), U.S.-U.S.S.R., 26 May,
1972, 23 U.S.T.S. 3435; Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons in the Atmosphere, Outer Space and Under
Water, U.S.-Gr. Brit.-U.S.S.R., Oct. 10, 1963, 480 U.N.T.S. 43 (No. 6964); Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty ("CTBT"), Sept. 24, 1996, not yet entered into force.
33. As of 2006, estimated nuclear stockpiles of the NWS Parties were: U.S.: 10,104, Russia: 16,000, U.K.:
200, France: 350, China: 200. Norris & Kristensen, supra note 27.
34. Id.
35. Int'l Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], Energy, Electricity and Nuclear Power Estimates for the Period up
to 2030, at 32-33, IAEA, RDS-1/28 (August 2008), available at http://www-
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power, and are not necessarily due to any failure of Parties to meet their obligations to
share nuclear technology.36
V. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was a Failure
Despite the near universality of accession to the NPT, and the decisions made by the
overwhelming majority of governments to not develop nuclear weapons capabilities, in
some aspects the NPT has failed in all three of its pillars. While the proliferation of nuclear
weapons capability has been minimal, it is unclear that this is directly attributable to the
non-proliferation pillar of the NPT. Like most treaties, the NPT only binds those who wish
to be bound. While the vast majority of countries have ratified the NPT, only those that
have already made an internal decision to forgo nuclear weapons development are signa-
tories. Countries intent on developing nuclear capabilities, such as India, Israel, and South
Africa, did not sign the NPT. 37 Since countries that are not parties are not bound by its pro-
visions, any country making the decision to develop a nuclear weapons capability can re-
main free to do so by declining to join the NPT. The fact that India is not a signatory to the
NPT and yet has recently signed a nuclear cooperation the United States is evidence that
the political costs of remaining outside of the NPT are manageable.38
A second, similar way that the NPT has failed is that it allows Parties that decide to de-
velop nuclear weapons, such as North Korea, to withdraw from the treaty. Withdrawal is
allowed under international treaty law, and Article X of the NPT explicitly gives Parties the
right to withdraw from the treaty if they decide that "extraordinary events ... have jeopar-
dized the supreme interests of its country."3 9 The NPT does not define what an "extraordi-
nary event" is, leaving a large loophole for parties to leave the treaty. For example, in 1993,
when the IAEA exposed North Korean plutonium extraction efforts, North Korea simply
announced that it was withdrawing from the NPT due to extraordinary events. 40 With no
clear way to refute the withdrawal, the United States and other countries had few options
other than giving North Korea concessions to coerce it into remaining a Party.41
The non-proliferation pillar is ineffective because there is no language in the NPT to ac-
tively encourage countries to join, or deter them from withdrawing. Admittedly there are
international political costs to not being a Party to the NPT, but countries such as India and
Israel are evidence that such costs are manageable. An NPT that does not depend on dip-
pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/RDS1-28_web.pdf.
36. Press Release, IAEA, Nuclear Power's Changing Future (Jun. 26, 2004), available at
http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/PressReleases/2004/prn200405.html.
[N]ew nuclear plants are expensive and can cost up to three times more to build than fossil-fueled
plants. They are large, take longer to build than fossil fuel plants, and face regulatory hurdles that
are often seen as a financial risk. These high construction costs are a greater disadvantage in
deregulated markets that value rapid returns on investment.
Id.
37. See Background: The Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, supra note 2.
38. See Deb Riechmann, Bush signs landmark US-India nuclear legislation, USA TODAY, Oct. 8, 2008,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2008-10-08-2356695469 x.htm.
39. NPT, supra note 1, art. X.
40. Young W. Kihl, Confrontation of Compromise? Lessons from the 1994 Crisis, in PEACE AND SECURITY IN
NORTHEAST ASIA 188 (Young Whan KihI & Peter Hayes eds., 1997).
41. Id.
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lomatic negotiations to coax countries to join, or to form coalitions willing to sanction a
withdrawing Party, would make for a stronger, more effective treaty.
The NPT has also failed in its disarmament pillar. When the NPT was signed in 1968,
there were approximately 39,000 nuclear weapons in the world.42 By 1986, that number
would grow to over 70,000.43 Since that time, worldwide nuclear stockpiles have shrunk to
less than 27,000, but it is more likely that this decline could be attributed to the end of the
Cold War, the high costs of maintenance, and to bilateral treaties between the U.S. and the
U.S.S.R. (such as SALT and START), than through direct pressure from obligations under
the NPT. None of the five NWS Parties have seriously considered complete disarmament. In
fact, in 2005 the United States modified their Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations to in-
crease the number of scenarios in which nuclear weapon use would be authorized.44 As re-
cently as March 2009, Russia announced that upgrading their nuclear forces was a "top
priority," implying that they have no intention of disarming in the foreseeable future.4s The
NWS Parties have treated the disarmament pillar as a long-term aspiration, as opposed to a
present obligation. In an April 2009 speech, President Obama recommitted the United
States to working towards eventual disarmament, but with the caveat that, "this goal will
not be reached quickly-perhaps not in my lifetime."46
For the NNWS Parties, the NPT has failed in the third pillar guarantee of access to the
peaceful uses of nuclear technology. The NPT was originally intended to provide commer-
cial nuclear technology to developing countries in what is sometimes called the "atoms for
peace" deal. Article V of the NPT states that "potential benefits from any peaceful applica-
tions of nuclear explosions will be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to
the Treaty."47 At the time the NPT was signed, there was some thought that nuclear explo-
sives might be used for industrial purposes, such as excavating large amounts of soil, or
blowing out oil well fires. For example, in 1965, the U.S.S.R. conducted the Chagan test,
where a 140kt nuclear device was used to create a crater that would dam a river and form
a lake.48 A number of similar tests were conducted in the United States at the Nevada Test
Site under the Department of Energy's Plowshares program.49 While some of the tests
proved effective, concerns about environmental contamination, proliferation of weapons
technology, and compliance with nuclear test ban treaties have led all of the five NWS Par-
ties to abandon the idea of developing peaceful nuclear explosions.50 Effectively, Article V is
42. Norris & Kristensen, supra note 27, at 64-66.
43. Id.
44. JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. No. 3-12, DOCTRINE FOR JOINT NUCLEAR OPERATIONS (2005), available at
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/policy/dod/jp3_12fc2.pdf.
45. Valdimir lsachenkov, Russia says NATO means new arms needed, SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 17, 2009,
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2008873356_apeurussiamilitary.html.
46. President Barack Obama, Remarks at Hradcany Square, Prague, Czech Republic (Apr. 5 2009),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/Remarks-By-President-Barack-Obama-In-
Prague-As-Delivered/.
47. NPT, supra note 1, art. V.
48. U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, UCRL-ID-124410, THE SOVIET PROGRAM FOR PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS
(1996), available at www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/doe/lanl/osti/408695.pdf
49. Id. at 3.
50. Id at 61 (noting that even a peaceful nuclear detonation is likely to be a violation of the
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty).
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dead.
NNWS Parties are still supposed to benefit from Article IV, which states that "[a]ll the
Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest
possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for
the peaceful uses of nuclear energy."51 Ideally, this provision should allow NNWS Parties to
develop peaceful nuclear energy technology, and receive assistance in doing so. Similar to
Article V, at the time the NPT was being negotiated, nuclear energy was considered the
energy source of the future, and the drafters of the NPT expected countries to take advan-
tage of this energy source, and Articles IV and V were to be the incentive for countries to
sign on as NNWS Parties. However, in the latter half of the twentieth century, environmen-
tal concerns made nuclear energy less attractive, and developing nations often do not have
the capital to make such a large investment or the infrastructure necessary to support it.
Even where they do, some countries have found that the NWS Parties, or at least the
United States, is strongly opposed to their development. In 2004, the United States an-
nounced that a major emphasis of its foreign policy would be to prevent the further spread
of uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing, despite the acknowledgement that
such actions are inconsistent with Article IV of the NPT.52 For example, Iran, a NNWS Party
to the NPT, has found itself under considerable pressure to abandon its nuclear power
reactor at Bushehr, despite the fact that the reactor is not suitable for breeding weapons-
grade plutonium and is under IAEA safeguards.53 It appears that in the world today,
whether a country receives help and encouragement for a domestic nuclear power pro-
gram has more to do with the power of that country's allies and enemies, as opposed to
their status as an NPT Party.54
While some countries have thriving nuclear power industries, a country cannot simply
claim adherence to the NPT as a NNWS Party as a sufficient justification for nuclear power
development programs, and few countries are taking advantage of their right to construct
nuclear power plants.55 Therefore the third pillar of the NPT, which was designed to be the
'carrot' to encourage countries to adhere to the provisions of the NPT, is no longer effective
as a realistic incentive.
51. NPT, supra note 1, art. IV § 2.
52. Dana Milbank & Peter Slevin, Bush Details Plan to Curb Nuclear Arms, WASH. POST, Feb. 12, 2004, at
A01.
53. Thomas R. Stauffer, Unlike Dimona, Iran's Bushehr Reactor Not Useful for Weapons Grade Plutonium,
WASH. REP. ON MIDDLE EAST AFF., Sept. 2003, at 28-29, available at
http://www.wrmea.com/archives/sept03/0309028.html.
54. Another example is the nascent Syrian nuclear program, which has been opposed by the United States
on non-proliferation grounds despite the fact that Syria has a right as an NNWS Party to the NPT to
develop civilian nuclear power. See Syria Had Covert Nuclear Scheme, BBC NEWS, Apr. 25, 2008,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle-east/7364269.stm.
55. As of 2007, only thirteen countries were constructing nuclear power plants. Only two nuclear power
plants are operational in all of Africa, and only six in all of Latin America. Riidiger Falksohn, A Nuclear
Power Renaissance, DER SPIEGEL, Jan. 1, 2007,
http://www.spiegel.de/international/spiegel/,1518,460011,00.html.
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VI. Shortcomings of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
Both technology and world politics have changed substantially since the NPT was origi-
nally drafted. Compared to more recent multilateral arms control treaties, the NPT is arc-
haic and has numerous problems. These problems contribute to the failures of the NPT and
limit its effectiveness at deterring nuclear proliferation. By understanding these problems
and addressing them, a much stronger, more effective NPT can be created.
The major criticism that can be leveled at the NPT is inequity. Unlike every other multi-
lateral arms control treaty, the NPT in effect has created two classes of parties, those with
nuclear weapons and those without.5 6 This is an inherently inequitable situation. The NPT
creates a "nuclear elite" that for forty years have been allowed to retain nuclear weapons
while forbidding all others from having them.57 Some argue that the NWS Parties could
draw a distinction between their "responsible" ownership of nuclear weapons and that of
the aspirant powers.58 Even if one were to accept this argument, the two-tiered system re-
mains a problem because it causes resentment in NNWS Parties about being treated as
second-class world citizens.59
For example, the government of India has repeatedly offered to sign the NPT as a NWS
Party.60 After being rebuffed and told that they will only be accepted into the treaty as a
NNWS Party, and therefore be required to give up their nuclear arsenal, India has declined
to become a signatory to the treaty. 61 This has left them outside the scope of the NPT, and
they are under no binding obligations to refrain from nuclear proliferation.
A second major shortcoming of the NPT is that, unlike some other multilateral treaties
56. Cf Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use Chemical
Weapons and on their Destruction ("Chemical Weapons Convention"), Jan. 13-15, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 800
(1993), S. TREATY Doc. No. 103-21 (treating all parties similarly); the Convention on the Prohibition of
the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and
on their Destruction ("Biological Weapons Convention"), opened for signature Apr. 10, 1972, 1015
U.N.T.S. 163 (entered into force Mar. 26, 1975) (same); the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, Sept. 24,
1996, not yet entered into force (same); the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, not yet entered into force
(same).
57. Former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan explains that for non-nuclear weapon states, "the NPT
Igrand bargain' has become a swindle." Press Release, Kofi Annan, Secretary-General, Lecture at
Princeton University Calling for Progress on Both Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, U.N.
Press Release SG/SM/10767 (Nov. 28, 2006), available at
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sgsml0767.doc.htm.
They note that the UN Security Council has often described the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction as a threat to international peace and security, but has never declared that nuclear
weapons in and of themselves are such a threat They see no serious movement towards nuclear
disarmament, and claim that the lack of such movement presages a permanent 'apartheid' between
nuclear 'haves' and 'have-nots.'
Id.
58. George Monbiot, We Lie and Bluster About Our Nukes-And Then Wag Our Fingers at Iran, THE
GUARDIAN, July 29, 2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/jul/29/nuclear.defence.
59. WILLIAM J. DURCH, CONSTRUCTING REGIONAL SECURITY-THE ROLE OF ARMS TRANSFERS, ARMS CONTROL, AND
REASSURANCE 148 (2000).
60. See Fidler, David P. and Sumit Ganguly, India Wants to join the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a Weapon
State, YALE GLOBAL ONLINE, Jan. 27, 2010, http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/india-wants-join-non-
proliferation-treaty
61. See, e.g., Manpreet Sethi, Nuclear Diplomacy: NPT Meeting Needs to Address Double Standards, TIMES OF
INDIA, Apr. 10 2005, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/1073672.cms.
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such as the Montreal Protocol, there are no automatic consequences for non-accession to
the treaty.62 While there has been some attempt to politically isolate non-signatories, the
effects of such isolation are often limited by the economic and political interests of coun-
tries willing to break that isolation.63 The failure of Articles IV and V to provide a 'carrot' to
NNWS Parties, and the absence of any language in the NPT mandating sanctions or other
'sticks' means that the only factor encouraging non-signatories to sign the NPT is a desire
to generate political goodwill and join the community of nations. Since the countries most
likely to develop nuclear weapons are the least likely to be concerned with generating po-
litical goodwill, the system is ineffectual at stopping the "bad actors," and only successfully
stops countries with little desire for nuclear weapons in the first place. The failure of the
NPT to provide either a carrot or a stick creates a scenario where the countries most likely
to develop nuclear weapons are the most likely to remain outside the scope of the NPT.
Similarly, since there are no defined penalties for withdrawal from the treaty, the NPT
doesn't encourage signatories to remain bound by the treaty. The primary example of this
is North Korea. North Korea was an NNWS Party to the NPT, and agreed to not develop
nuclear weapons. In 1993, the IAEA demanded special inspections of several suspicious
nuclear facilities in North Korea.64 North Korea responded by announcing they would
withdraw from the NPT.65 While North Korea agreed to 'suspend' their withdrawal only
after heated negotiations, in 2003, after another round of increased tensions with their
neighbors and disagreements with the IAEA, North Korea withdrew from the NPT, and
soon after detonated their first nuclear device.66 North Korea's actions show the inability of
the NPT to act as a deterrent to proliferation.67 If any Party to the NPT can simply walk
away from the treaty obligations whenever they decide to develop a nuclear weapon, then
the NPT is a paper tiger. As noted above, there is no language in the NPT that forces Parties
to take any action against a country that declines to sign, abrogates, or withdraws from the
treaty. This means that the only countries that will be bound by the treaty's provisions are
those who are already willing to not develop nuclear weapons.
Similarly, the NPT is also insufficient in the fact that there are no penalties for non-
compliance, especially for NWS Parties. There are no consequences to NWS Parties provid-
ing nuclear technology to non-signatories. In 2006, the United States signed a deal with In-
dia to provide nuclear fuel, despite the fact that India is not a signatory to the NPT, and is a
62. Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, S. TREATY Doc. No. 100-
10 (1987), 1522 U.N.T.S. 3, available at www.unep.org/ozone/pdf/Montreal-Protocol2000.pdf
[hereinafter Montreal Protocol].
63. See, e.g., Riechmann, supra note 38.
64. SARAH J. DIEHL & JAMES C. MOLTZ, NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND NONPROLIFERATION 21 (2007).
65. Id.
66. N Korea Withdraws From Nuclear Pact, BBC NEWS, Jan. 10 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-
pacific/2644593.stm; North Korea Claims Nuclear Test, BBC NEWS, Oct. 9, 2006,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/6032525.stm.
67. Admittedly, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) did vote to condemn the test. However, they
were only able to pass the resolution by barring the possibility of taking military actions, and the
sanctions arguably had little practical effect on the country. In any case, the UNSC would likely have
condemned the test regardless of the existence of the NPT. S.C. Res. 1718, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1718 (Oct.
14, 2006).
319
HeinOnline  -- 9 Santa Clara J. Int'l L. 319 2011
9 SANTA CLARA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW309 (2011)
de facto NWS. 68 Since then, other countries such as France and Canada have moved to sell
nuclear technology to India as well.69 Again, the NPT proves to be a paper tiger. Without a
mandated sanctions regime explicitly spelled out in the treaty text, a proliferant country
may suffer limited consequences from their decision, especially if it remains in the interest
of a NWS Party to maintain relationships with the proliferant.70
Admittedly, the IAEA reports potential violations to the United Nations Security Council
(UNSC), and the UNSC has sometimes imposed sanctions on nuclear proliferants. 71 Howev-
er, the sanctions imposed by these resolutions are weaker than those the UNSC had pre-
viously imposed in response to many lesser threats to international peace and security.72
The peaceful uses pillar also suffers from shortcomings in that Articles IV and V have
failed in their promise to provide nuclear technology to NNWS Parties. NWS Parties have
worried that NNWS Parties could abuse nuclear technology such as gas centrifuges by re-
purposing them into a clandestine nuclear weapons development program, and have taken
actions to limit their development.73 On the other side, NNWS Parties have stated that the
NWS Parties are not living up to their end of the bargain by not allowing access to nuclear
technology.74
For example, Iran has long been arguing that the NPT gives it the right to develop a nuc-
lear power infrastructure, including a uranium enrichment capability.75 However, the Unit-
68. Jim Vandehei & Dafna Linzer, U.S. India Reach Deal on Nuclear Cooperation, WASH. POST, Mar. 3, 2006,
at A01, available at http://www.washingtonpostcom/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/03/02/AR2006030200183.html.
69. Greg Keller, France's Areva, India Sign Nuclear Reactor Deal, CBC NEWS, Feb. 4, 2009,
http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/story/2009/02/04/france-india.html; Bruce Cheadle, Canada joins
rush to sell nuclear to India, THE GUARDIAN, Jan. 22, 2009,
http://www.theguardian.pe.ca/Business/Natural-resources/2009-01-23/article-1287134/Canada-
joins-rush-to-sell-nuclear-to-India/1.
70. For example, the threat of the use of a veto, and even the mere knowledge that a veto might be
utilized, has likely prevented the UNSC from proposing sanctions against the Israeli nuclear program.
JEREMY MATAM FARRALL, UNITED NATIONS SANCTIONS AND THE RULE OF LAW 213 (2008).
71. S.C. Res. 1718, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1718 (Oct. 14, 2006) (imposing sanctions against North Korea after
their nuclear test); S.C. Res. 1737, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1737 (Dec. 23, 2006) (imposing sanctions against
Iran).
72. For example, they are weaker than the sanctions imposed on South Africa in response to apartheid
and on Liberia and C6te d'Ivoire during their civil wars, and far weaker than those imposed on Libya
in response to its downing of Pan Am flight 103, Sierra Leone in response to its May 1997 military
coup, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia during the Bosnian crisis, and Haiti in response to its 1991
military coup. Orde F. Kittrie, Averting Catastrophe: Why the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty is Losing
its Deterrence Capacity and How to Restore it, 28 MICH. J. INT'L L. 337, 377-78 (2007).
73. See, e.g., UN Passes Iran Nuclear Sanctions, BBC NEws, Dec. 23, 2006,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle east/6205295.stm.
74. For example, Iran's permanent representative to the IAEA recently said,
lilt is unacceptable that some countries tend to limit the access to peaceful nuclear technology to an
exclusive club of technologically advanced States under the pretext of non-proliferation. This
attitude is in clear violation of the letter and spirit of the Treaty and destroys the fundamental
balance, which exists between the rights and obligations in the Treaty.
Ali Asghar Soltanieh, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Iran to the U.N. and Other Int'l
Orgs., Speech at the first session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 NPT Review Conference
(May 1, 2007), http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2007/statements/iran-01-05_pm-final-version.pdf.
75. See, e.g., IAEA, Communication dated 26 March 2008 received from the Permanent Mission of the Islamic
Republic of Iran to the Agency, IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/724 (Mar. 28, 2008), available at
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2008/infcirc724.pdf (arguing that UNSC
resolutions against Iran are in violation of the rights guaranteed by the NPT).
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ed Nations has imposed sanctions against Iran out of fear that it will use this technology to
develop a nuclear weapons capability. 76 The drafters of the NPT failed to account for the
fact that it is difficult to firewall nuclear power technologies from nuclear weapons tech-
nologies. The same gas centrifuge that can be used to enrich uranium for nuclear fuel can
also be used to enrich to weapons-grade uranium. The same reactor technology used to
power homes can also be used for breeding plutonium. 77 For example, the North Koreans
operated the Yongbyon nuclear reactor for peaceful commercial power generation. How-
ever, the same gas centrifuge that can be used to enrich uranium for nuclear fuel can also
be used to enrich weapons-grade uranium.78 As written, Articles IV and V of the NPT create
tension because NNWS Parties feel that they should have the right to develop the technolo-
gy and that they are being deprived of that right despite being Parties to the treaty. Con-
versely, based on the North Korean example, Parties are right to fear that the development
of nuclear power technology can be used as a backdoor to nuclear weapons development.
Finally, while Article VI of the NPT obligates NWS Parties to disarm, it provides no me-
chanism to push them towards that goal. The treaty provides no timetables or intermediate
steps to disarmament, so this provision is toothless.79 While steps towards nuclear disar-
mament have been taken, these have been accomplished mainly through bilateral treaties
such as SALT and START, and are not directly attributable to the NPT. To date, none of the
five NWS Parties to the NPT has announced a concrete plan to completely disarm. Not only
does this make the NPT ineffective in its ultimate goal of ridding the world of nuclear wea-
pons, but it also creates tension with the NNWS Parties. When the treaty was initially
opened for signature in 1968, many countries signed on as NNWS Parties under the as-
sumption that reasonably soon after the treaty entered into force, the five NWS Parties
would disarm.80 When other multilateral arms control treaties, such as the Chemical Wea-
pons Convention (CWC) and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), were signed,
countries with those arms made a pledge to disarm, and have kept those promises.8' How-
76. UN Passes Iran Nuclear Sanctions, supra note 73.
77. Monitors 'to See N Korea Reactor,' BBC NEWS, June 27, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-
pacific/6243874.stm.
78. Id.
79. Parties have attempted to get the NWS Parties to commit to disarmament timelines in the period
review conferences, but without much success. For example, in the 1995 NPT Review Conference, the
Package of Decisions calls for the passage of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the Fissile
Material Cutoff Treaty. 1995 NPT Review Conference, Apr. 17-May 12, 1995, Package of Decisions,
U.N. Doc. NPT/CONF.1995/32 (May 12, 1995), available at
http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/1995-NPT/pdf/NPT-CONF199501.pdf. However,
as of 2010, neither treaty has entered into force. Id.
80. While it is impossible to say what timeline the individual signatories anticipated, the fact that
disagreements over Article VI fulfillment were the most contentious parts of the First NPT Review
Conference (in 1975), and the Second (in 1980) imply that NNWS Parties were expecting NWS Parties
to take actions towards complete disarmament in the first few years after the NPT entered into force.
NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 52-53 (Morten Bremer Maerli & Sverre Lodgaard
eds., 2007).
81. While countries such as the United States and Russia have not met the CWC deadlines for destroying
their large quantities of chemical agents, the agents have been removed from each country's
"stockpile," have been deweaponized, and are no longer consider part of their arsenals or play any
part in their military operations doctrines. See U.S. ARMY CHEM. MATERIALS AGENCY,
http://www.cma.army.mil (last accessed Apr. 13, 2011).
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ever, the failure of the NWS Parties to keep their pledge to disarm seems unfair to the
NNWS Parties, and provides an argument for their development of nuclear weapons tech-
nology. It can be difficult to create a unanimous international condemnation of a nuclear
aspirant such as Pakistan or India when other countries retain the right to use nuclear
weapons themselves. In addition, the continued failure of the NWS Parties to seriously
consider disarmament has led to a number of countries questioning whether the NPT
should continue at all.8 2 At the Fifth NPT Review Conference in 1995, there was considera-
ble resistance to extending the treaty based primarily on the failure of the five NWS Parties
to satisfy their obligations under Article VI. 83
VII. Why is it Important to Update the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty?
While the NPT represented an important step in controlling the proliferation of nuclear
weapons, as written the treaty is not designed to meet modern problems. There are a
number of reasons why it is important to update the treaty to modern standards of inter-
national law.
First when the NPT was signed, the world was essentially bi-polar, boiling down to the
United States and its NATO allies on one side versus the U.S.S.R. and its Warsaw Pact allies
on the other. The worldview of the drafters of the NPT was that if the Superpowers ad-
hered to the treaty, smaller countries would be prevented from independently developing
nuclear weapons. 4 But today's world is far more multi-polar, and the United States and
other NWS Parties do not retain the same influence over potential proliferants they once
may have had.
In addition, as technology advances and information becomes more available, it be-
comes easier for smaller, less developed countries to acquire nuclear technology simply,
cheaply, and indigenously. The Manhattan Project cost an estimated $26 billion in today's
dollars, a sum out of the reach for all but a few countries.8 5 But technological advances
have made development far easier to achieve. For example, Saddam Hussein's nuclear de-
velopment program focused on a uranium enrichment method known as EMIS.8 6 EMIS was
originally developed in the 1940's and was considered outdated and obsolete.87 But Iraqi
scientists relied on the fact that details of EMIS enrichment technology were available in
the open literature and the machines were simple enough to manufacture that they could
82. Eugene Carroll, The NPT Review-Last Chance?, 29 DEF. MONITOR, no. 3, 2000 at 1-3, available at
http://www.cdi.org/dm/2000/issue3/NPT.html.
83. Id. at 1.
84. A good example of the thinking of the day is McNamara's memo to President Kennedy in which
McNamara's calculus of the number of future nuclear weapons states is partially driven by which
countries the U.S.S.R. would 'allow' to develop nuclear weapons. Memorandum from Robert
McNamara, supra note 25.
85. Kevin O'Neill, Building the Bomb, in ATOMIC AUDIT 33, 33 (Stephen I. Schwartz ed., 1998).
86. Charles Duelfer, Uranium Enrichment-EMIS, in 2 COMPREHENSIVE REP. OF THE SPECIAL ADVISOR TO THE
DCl ON IRAQ's WMD 42, 42 (2004), available at
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/report/2004/isg-final-report/isg-final-
reportvol2_nuclear-12.htm.
87. Electromagnetic Isotope Separation Uranium Enrichment, GLOBALSECURITY.ORG,
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/intro/u-electromagnetic.htm (last accessed Apr. 13, 2011).
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be made using Iraq's existing infrastructure.8 8
Since the world has changed since the NPT was drafted, improving the NPT is necessary
to allowing it to remain an important tool in preventing non-aligned, less industrialized
countries such as Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. More importantly, updating the
NPT could prevent terrorist groups and other non-state actors from acquiring nuclear
weapons.
A second reason to update the NPT is to improve equity between NWS Parties and
NNWS Parties. Issues of inequity are a thorn in the side of third world countries, and de-
veloping a more inclusive, more equitable system could alleviate tensions not directly re-
lated to nuclear weapons.89 Nuclear weapons are possibly the ultimate tool in retaining he-
gemony.90 It is well known that the five NWS Parties also happen to be the five permanent
members of the UNSC. People in many countries equate possession of nuclear weapons
with status, and the ability to bully around those that do not possess nuclear weapons.91
For example, Iran constantly decries the inherent unfairness of being pressured to not de-
velop nuclear weapons while the United States and Israel are allowed to have them.92 Simi-
larly, North Korea developed nuclear weapons so as to be taken seriously as a country and
to serve as a deterrent against perceived American aggression.9 3 Even terrorist groups
have publicly stated that they have the right to possess nuclear arms as a counterbalance
to perceived American aggression.94 The inequitable nature of the NPT has led a number of
countries to conclude that regardless of their obligations as NNWS Parties, they have a
right to nuclear weapons in a way that is not mirrored in chemical or biological weapons.
An updated NPT could change the way the world views the acceptability of nuclear arms.
The third reason to update the NPT is that at present, concerns over proliferation are
acting as an obstacle to the development of nuclear energy. The looming threat of climate
change requires new energy solutions that are not based on fossil fuels, and nuclear energy
could be a large part of that mix.95 However, without a better way to mitigate the concerns
over dual-use technology and nuclear weapons development, it is unlikely that the major
powers will be willing to see certain types of nuclear technology become widely available
in the third world. For example, the UNSC has authorized sanctions against Iran for its de-
88. Duefler, supra note 86, at 42.
89. See generally DURCH, supra note 59.
90. See, e.g., JAMES PETRAS & MORRIS MORLEY, US HEGEMONY UNDER SIEGE 107 (1990); Paul Reynolds,
Nuclear Weapons: Can they be stopped?, BBC NEWS, Sept. 22, 2004,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3680418.stm.
91. Reynolds, supra note 90.
92. Id. See also IAEA, supra note 75.
93. North Korea Vows 'Annihilating' Nuclear Strike if United States Attacks Pre-Emptively, FoxNEWS, July 3,
2006, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,201956,00.html.
94. In a 2001 interview Osama bin Laden said, "I wish to declare that if America used chemical or nuclear
weapons against us, then we may retort with chemical and nuclear weapons." The Man who
Interviewed Osama bin Laden 3 Times, THE INDEPENDENT, Mar 9, 2009,
http://www.independentco.uk/news/media/press/the-man-who-interviewed-osama-bin-laden-3-
times-1639968.html.
95. Economic, safety, and environmental arguments against nuclear energy notwithstanding (and outside
the scope of this paper). See Patrick Moore, Going Nuclear, WASH. POST, Apr. 16, 2006, at B01, available
at http://www.washingtonpostcom/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/04/14/AR2006041401209.html.
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velopment of the Natanz Uranium Enrichment Plant due to worries about Iran's nuclear
weapons program, even though uranium enrichment is a permitted activity under the
NPT.96 An updated NPT that includes increased transparency and safeguards could help to
reduce tension over secret weapons programs and allow nuclear power to flourish.
VIII. Modern Treaties that Can Offer Guidance on How to Update the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
Since the NPT entered into force, a number of other multilateral arms control treaties
have been developed. In many cases, these treaties have dealt with similar issues to the
ones the NPT was designed to address, and have addressed the issues in a different man-
ner, perhaps learning from the deficiencies of the NPT. For example, when the Chemical
Weapons Convention (CWC) was being developed, the drafters were faced with the similar
problem that some countries already had significant stockpiles of chemical weapons. In-
stead of taking the NPT's tactic of setting up a two-tiered system of 'Chemical Weapons
States' and 'Non-Chemical Weapons States,' the drafters mandated that all countries wish-
ing to be Party to the CWC must completely give up their chemical weapon inventories.97
During the treaty negotiations, both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. had argued that they should be
allowed to retain a stockpile of up to 500 tons of agent.98 However, unlike the NPT, the rest
of the world was unwilling to accept a two-tiered treaty, and the U.S. and U.S.S.R. eventual-
ly capitulated and agreed to complete destruction of their stockpiles.99
Lessons might also be taken from the large number of bilateral nuclear weapons agree-
ments that have been negotiated since the NPT entered into force. These bilateral agree-
ments have been successful in encouraging the five NWS Parties to reduce their invento-
ries and improve controls and communications. These treaties may be of special value in
updating the disarmament pillar of the NPT, since they were focused on creating confi-
dence-building measures and reducing nuclear stockpiles.
Even multilateral treaties that are non-arms control related could also provide some
guidance on how to update the NPT. For example, the drafters of the Montreal Protocol on
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer realized that in order for the treaty to be effec-
tive, there would have to be almost total compliance. So they added terms into the treaty to
encourage countries to accede to the treaty and included a sliding scale of obligations in
order to increase fairness and to discourage Parties from abrogating or withdrawing from
the treaty in the future. 00 The lessons learned from the success of the Montreal Protocol
can be applied to the NPT to mitigate the proliferation problems posed by non-Parties.
96. S.C. Res. 1737, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1737 (Dec. 23, 2006), available at
http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/Iaealran/unscresl737-2006.pdf. See also Ahmadinejad
rejects UN sanctions, BBC NEWS, Dec. 24, 2006,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle-east/6207319.stm.
97. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical
Weapons and on Their Destruction art. 1, Jan. 13 1993, 32 I.L.M. 800 (1993), available at
http://www.opcw.org/chemical-weapons-convention/articles/article-i-general-obligations/
[hereinafter CWC].
98. JOZEF GOLDBLAT, ARMS CONTROL: THE NEw GUIDE TO NEGOTIATIONS AND AGREEMENTS 146 (2002).
99. Id.
100. Montreal Protocol, supra note 62, arts. 4-5, 8.
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IX. Roadmap for Updating the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
The provisions of the NPT, particularly Article Vill, paragraph 3, create a treaty review
process in which the Parties meet every five years to discuss treaty performance and sug-
gest improvements.1 01 The Seventh Review Conference was held in 2005, and was consi-
dered a failure by many countries that had hoped to make substantive changes to the
NPT.102 The 2005 Conference focused on three main issues: nuclear disarmament and se-
curity assurances, safeguards and regional issues (including establishment of a nuclear
weapon-free zone in the Middle East), and implementation of the NPT's provisions related
to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.10 3 However, no substantive changes were made. The
Eighth Review Conference was held in 2010, and many of the same issues were ad-
dressed. 104 Similar to 2005, the conference ended with lofty rhetoric about commitments
to the goals of the NPT, but no substantive changes. 105 The biggest result of the 2010 Con-
ference was the final declaration, which resolved to hold a Middle East conference in
2012-not to establish such a zone, but to begin the process of establishing one.10 6
The Ninth Review Conference is scheduled to occur in the spring of 2015, and it is likely
that many of the same issues will be re-addressed. Considering the failures of the 2005 and
2010 Conferences, countries will undoubtedly redouble their efforts to make substantive
changes to the NPT. The 2015 forum may provide a unique opportunity to completely
overhaul the NPT to bring it in line with more modern treaties and to improve effective-
ness and equity. At that conference, the Parties should consider the following recommen-
dations:
A. Design a Rregime that Creates Incentives for Nuclear Weapons States to Disarm
The NPT is unique among modern arms control treaties in that it creates two classes of
Parties: those who are allowed to possess nuclear weapons and those who are not. This in-
herent unfairness has led to countries such as India refusing to sign the treaty. Indian De-
fence Minister Pranab Mukherjee called the NPT "discriminatory and flawed" because it
creates a de facto permanent elite class of NWS Parties.107
The fact that the NWS Parties expect to continue retention of their nuclear stockpiles for the fore-
seeable future has led some to question the entire treaty. U.N. Under Secretary General layanatha
Dhanapala, President of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, was quoted as saying, Un-
less there is substantial progress-evidence in the nuclear disarmament field-we are going to have
101. NPT, supra note 1, art. VIII.
102. Press Release, NPT Review Conference, Review Conference for Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
Concludes with Many States Expressing Deep Disappointment at Outcome, U.N. Press Release
DC/2969 (May 27, 2005), available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/dc2969.doc.htm.
103. Id.
104. 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,
UN.ORG, http://www.un.org/NPT2010/ (last accessed Apr. 6, 2011).
105. Press Release, U.S. State Dep't, Facts of Nonproliferation treaty Review Conference Final Document,
(May 28, 2010), available at http://www.america.gov/st/texttrans-
english/2010/May/20100528200026ihecuor0.3064473.html.
106. Barbara Plett, Modest Progress at Nuclear Conference, BBC NEWS, May 29, 2010,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/us-and-canada/10188928.stm.
107. India Not to Sign NPT: Pranab, TRIBUNE NEWS SERV., July 21 2005,
http://www.tribuneindia.com/2005/20050721/punjabl.htm.
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very serious erosion of the confidence of states parties to the Treaty. This could be quite dangerous
for the future, and so I would hope that the nuclear-weapon states in particular and the other sup-
porters of the indefinite extension of the Treaty... would bear this in mind and work together with
other states parties to ensure that the objectives of the Treaty are fulfilled, and soon.108
Study of the provisions of the NPT shows that it was meant to be the first step in the
eventual complete disarmament of all Parties. In the NPT preamble, it is stated that the
treaty is designed "to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the
liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of
nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a Treaty on general and com-
plete disarmament under strict and effective international control."10 9 Article VI of the
Treaty calls on NWS Parties to "pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures re-
lating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament,
and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective interna-
tional control."110 Unfortunately, it has not been successful on this issue.
For guidance on how the NPT could be improved, it may be helpful to examine how the
CWC addressed a similar problem. By the time the CWC was opened for signature, a num-
ber of countries had fully developed chemical weapons programs and relatively large
stockpiles. However, unlike the NPT, the CWC did not form two classes of signatories. Ar-
ticle I of the CWC makes it very clear that "[ejach State Party to this Convention undertakes
never under any circumstances ... to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or re-
tain chemical weapons....111 Article I further stipulates that all Parties are to destroy all
chemical weapons stockpiles as well as all chemical weapons production facilities. 112 The
language of the CWC is much stronger than the mere suggestive language of Article VI of
the NPT, which only requires NWS Parties to "undertake| to pursue negotiations" on com-
plete disarmament, and is more all-inclusive than Article II of the NPT, which obligates on-
ly NNWS Parties to refrain from acquiring nuclear weapons. 113
The CWC also anticipates that countries with large stockpiles are not going to be able to
immediately get rid of them. Article IV(6) of the CWC sets a hard timetable for destruction,
mandating that countries with chemical weapons stockpiles shall begin destroying their
stockpiles within two years and complete destruction within ten.114 Any state ratifying the
convention after this ten-year period is obligated to destroy their stockpiles as soon as
possible.11 s By allowing countries with stockpiles a grace period to disarm, the CWC is able
108. Daniel Plesch & Stephen Young, A Permanent Non-Proliferation Treaty, BASIc REPS. NEWSL., June 1,
1995, at 1-3.
109. NPT, supra note 1, pmbl.
110. Id. art. VI.
111. CWC, supra note 97, art. I.
112. Id.
113. NPT, supra note 1, arts. II, VI.
114. CWC, supra note 97, art. IV(6). Admittedly neither the U.S. nor Russia achieved their ten-year
timeline, and are unlikely to meet the negotiated extension. However, both countries are working
towards destruction, and extensions are permitted under the CWC, provided they are made at least
180 days before the deadline with a detailed explanation of the reasons for the request and plans for
achieving destruction by the revised extension date. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Def., U.S. Chemical
Weapons Destruction Extension Requested (Sept 3, 2003), available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=5635.
115. CWC, supra note 97, art. IV(8).
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to allow countries to gradually come into compliance. This reduces the economic burden
on countries with large stockpiles, but it also helps to build confidence. Each Party with a
stockpile can be assured that other Parties are meeting their obligations at the same time.
Countries may not be willing to immediately disarm if they are worried that their enemies
are not also doing likewise. Under the CWC, a country can be confident that others are in-
volved in the disarmament process before the final deadline to disarm arrives.
By mandating that all countries completely disarm their chemical stockpiles, the CWC
achieves its fundamental objective of ridding the world of chemical weapons, and main-
tains equity between countries. This equity is important for two reasons. First, it stops
countries from using the excuse of, "our enemies have these weapons so we need them al-
so." Second, it makes a clear statement to the world that these weapons are unacceptable,
creating a form of customary international law putting chemical weapons outside of the jus
in bello and placing those who would acquire such weapons outside of the community of
nations.
The NPT should be modified to include hard timetables for the five NWS Parties to com-
pletely disarm their nuclear stockpiles. Like the CWC, the modified NPT should create a
grace period whereby NWS States could gradually come into compliance, and should con-
tain verifiable intermediate milestones towards disarmament. The NPT should follow the
format of the CWC's Annex on Implementation and Verification. The CWC Annex starts
with a requirement that Parties declare their stockpiles of chemical weapons.116 The Annex
then requires Parties to commence destruction of chemical agents in an agreed-upon order
focusing on the most deadly chemical agents first.117 The CWC goes on to require destruc-
tion begin within two years, and has intermediate milestones that require Parties to de-
stroy a percentage of their stockpile each year for ten years.118
The NPT should be modified to reflect a similar schedule. NWS Parties should be re-
quired to declare their stockpile of nuclear weapons, and then begin destruction according
to an agreed-upon timeline that reflects realistic assessments of how quickly the weapons
can be dismantled safely and efficiently.
Unlike the current NPT, which just provides aspirational language suggesting that the
NWS States eventually disarm, these timetables and milestones will reduce the incentive of
states such as India to keep their nuclear programs alive out of a sense of discrimination,
and will reduce the worries of NWS Parties that they will be left defenseless if they disarm
while others do not.
If the NWS Parties commit to full disarmament, it will also change the acceptability of
nuclear weapons possession. Many nuclear aspirants such as Iran and North Korea can ar-
gue that if other countries are allowed to have nuclear weapons, they should be allowed to
have them as well. This is a basic sovereignty argument, and it is difficult to refute. By
creating a hard commitment for all countries to give up nuclear weapons, countries such as
Iran and North Korea will find their arguments much harder to make. The prohibition on
nuclear arms will become a part of customary international law, and possession will be
116. Id., annex on Implementation and Verification pt. IV(A), § 8.
117. Id., annex on Implementation and Verification pt. IV(C), §§ 15-16.
118. Id., annex on Implementation and Verification pt. IV(C), § 17.
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more internationally taboo. While this does not absolutely prevent a country from making
the choice to develop nuclear weapons, it would significantly increase both domestic and
international pressures to disarm.
NWS Parties may balk at the idea of disarmament without confidence-building meas-
ures that the other NWS states are disarming as well. While this is certainly a legitimate
concern, numerous other treaties have effectively dealt with the same issue. There are
three ways that an NPT verification protocol could be structured: the CWC model, the IAEA
model, and the SALT model.
The first option to ensure that disarmament obligations are being met is to add language
to the NPT similar to the CWC Annex on Implementation and Verification. The Annex con-
tains specific language on how verification activities are to be carried out in order to en-
sure compliance.11 9 Verification of nuclear stockpiles is easier than verification for chemi-
cal stockpiles for several reasons. First, the infrastructure required to produce plutonium
or highly enriched uranium (HEU) is significantly larger, more expensive, and more unique
than the infrastructure required to produce chemical agents. Second, there are fewer dual-
use nuclear facilities worldwide than dual-use chemical facilities. Third, trace amounts of
radioactive materials are easier to detect than trace amounts of chemical materials. In ad-
dition, nuclear weapons and chemical weapons present similar concerns over the inadver-
tent disclosure of military secrets to inspectors. Since the drafters of the CWC believed that
they could accurately verify whether or not Parties were meeting their chemical weapons
obligations, there is no reason to believe that the same verification protocols would not
adequately work for verifying a Party's nuclear obligations.
A second option would be to extend the current IAEA agreement for safeguards to NWS
Parties. 120 The IAEA already has a robust inspection mechanism designed to ensure the
timely detection or diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful
nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons. The IAEA has been applying
these safeguards to NNWS Parties since 1972, and has updated and modernized its safe-
guards system. 121 If the IAEA believes that its verification protocols are sufficient to ensure
that NNWS Parties do not have a clandestine nuclear weapons development program, it is
reasonable to believe that similar protocols will be sufficient to prevent NWS Parties from
cheating on their disarmament commitments.
A third option for verification can be found in the text of the SALT I treaty.122 Article XV
119. Id., annex on Implementation and Verification pt. IV(D).
120. IAEA, The Structure and Content of Agreements between the Agency and States Required in Connection
with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/153 (June 1972),
available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcircl53.pdf.
121. Iraq's nuclear weapons development program went undetected by the IAEA in 1991. Albright David
and Robert Kelly, Has Iraq Come Clean at Last?, BULL. OF ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, 53, 55-60 (Nov. 1995). In
response, IAEA has placed more emphasis on the additional goal of detecting clandestine acquisition
activities. This has resulted in the IAEA's Strengthened Safeguards System (S3 ), formerly called 93 + 2.
IAEA, Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between States(s) and the International Atomic
Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards, IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/540 (corrected) (Sept. 1997),
available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/1998/infcirc540corrected.pdf
[hereinafter Model Safeguards Agreement].
122. Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the
Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, Together with Agreed Statement and Common
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of SALT recognizes that in order to provide assurance of compliance, each country is ex-
pected to use National Technical Means for verification, and that no country shall interfere
with the use of National Technical Means.123 A similar provision could be worked into the
updated NPT as a Protocol, which would suggest that the five NWS Parties use and share
National Technical Means as a mechanism for assuring compliance with the disarmament
timetables. 124 Considering that both the United States and Russia have had significant ex-
perience in developing inspection regimes related to their bilateral nuclear arms treaties,
and have been satisfied with their ability to verify each other's compliance to those trea-
ties, it is conceivable that NWS Parties could develop a regime that would allow them to be
confident that the other NWS Parties were meeting their disarmament obligations.125
The United States proposed the SALT model of using National Technical Means to en-
sure compliance for use in the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty.126 The U.S. argued that no ve-
rification protocol would be completely effective, even if it was so extensive that it could
compromise the core national security interests of key signatories. 127 The U.S. further ar-
gued that mechanisms and provisions that provide the appearance of effective verification
without supplying its reality could be more dangerous than having no explicit provisions
for verification. 128 Such mechanisms and provisions could provide a false sense of security.
Counterintuitively, even with no verification, a complete disarmament provision would
still have positive effects, even if there was some cheating.129 First, any country willing to
cheat and retain nuclear weapons would incur a significantly higher economic cost to
Understandings Regarding the Treaty, U.S.-U.S.S.R., June 18, 1979, S. EXEC. DOC. Y, 96-1 (1979),
available at http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/treaties/salt2-2.html [hereinafter SALT 1].
123. The term "National Technical Means" generally refers to satellite imagery as well as other
intelligence-gathering activities. It was first used in the SALT I treaty, and reflected a concern that the
"Soviet Union could be particularly disturbed by public recognition of this capability [satellite
photography] . . . which it has veiled." See Memorandum from Melvin Laird, Sec'y of Def., to the
Assistant to the President for Nat'l Sec. Affairs (June 8, 1972),
http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB23 1/docG2.pdf.
124. Admittedly, SALT I was designed to limit missiles and large objects that are detectible by satellite
reconnaissance. SALT I, supra, note 122. The ability of National Technical Means to detect small
quantities of Plutonium is not proven. However, new technologies are increasing detection
capabilities, and the U.S. has committed tens of millions of dollars funding research in this area. See,
e.g., Domestic Nuclear Detection Office-National Science Foundation Academic Research Initiative,
NAT'L Scis. FOUND., http://www.nsf.gov/pubs/2009/nsfO9532/nsfO9S32.html (last accessed Apr. 15,
2011).
125. In the United States, arms control related inspections are performed by the On-Site Inspection
Agency, a component of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. See On-Site Inspection Agency Home
Page, DEF. THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY, http://www.dtra.mil/Home.aspx (last accessed Apr. 6, 2011).
126. Press Release, Dep't of Def., USA: White Paper on a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty-Conference on
Disarmament (May 18, 2006), available at http://2001-2009.state.gov/t/isn/rls/other/66901.htm.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Note that a number of long-standing, successful international arms control treaties do not have
verification or enforcement provisions. Examples include the Geneva Protocol, the Hague Convention
of 1907, and the Conventional Weapons Convention. See, e.g., The Protocol for the Prohibition of the
Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare,
June 17, 1925, 94 L.N.T.S. 65, available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/1925a.htm
[hereinafter Geneva Protocol]; see also Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling,
Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, Sept 18, 1997, 2056
U.N.T.S. 211, 36 I.L.M. 1507, available at http://www.icbl.org/treaty/text/english [hereinafter Ottawa
Treaty].
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doing so because of increased security needs. Those higher economic costs could convince
a country to make the economic decision to not cheat. Second, cheaters run the risk of in-
ternational condemnation and criticism if their program is ever discovered. Those political
costs could convince a country to make the political decision to not cheat. Third, all NWS
Parties currently argue that they retain their weapons for their deterrent capabilities. 130
Any clandestine nuclear program would almost certainly eliminate any deterrent capabili-
ty, since it is impossible to deter an adversary with weapons you cannot admit to (or even
imply) possessing. The decreased usefulness of a clandestine nuclear program could con-
vince countries that it is not worthwhile to cheat. Finally, while an NWS Party may clandes-
tinely retain a handful of nuclear weapons, it will not be possible to retain anywhere near
the quantity of weapons, personnel, and facilities that the U.S. and Russia currently retain.
A world with a handful of carefully hidden nuclear weapons presents a smaller risk of
global-scale catastrophe than one with tens of thousands of nuclear weapons, and the cor-
responding possibility of Mutually Assured Destruction and nuclear Armageddon.
B. As an Intermediate Step, Include a "No First Use" Provision into the Treaty
Admittedly, convincing the five NWS Parties to completely disarm is an ambitious goal,
notwithstanding the obligations of Article VI. As an intermediate step, the NPT should be
modified to prohibit Parties from being the first to use nuclear weapons. Since no nuclear
weapon has been used offensively since 1945, there is already a de facto norm on non-use
in customary international law, but this should be codified in the text of the treaty.
Adding a use prohibition would bring the NPT in-line with other arms control treaties
designed to control certain types of weapons. For example, Article I of the CWC explicitly
obligates all Parties to never, under any circumstances, use chemical weapons or engage in
military preparations to use chemical weapons.131 Similarly, The Geneva Protocol also ex-
plicitly prohibits the "use of bacteriological methods of warfare."132 The Ottawa Treaty has
a similar provision obligating Parties to "never under any circumstances... use anti-
personnel mines."13 3 There are other examples as well.134
Since, unlike the treaties related to chemical and biological weapons, the NPT does allow
NWS Parties to (at least temporarily) retain nuclear arsenals, a complete non-use provision
130. See, e.g. Brown Backs Trident Replacement, BBC NEWS, Jun. 21, 2006,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk-news/politics/5103764.stm; Sr. Col. Yao Yunzhu, China's Perspective
on Nuclear Deterrence, AIR & SPACE POWER J., Spring 2010,
http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj10/sprI0/yao.html.
131. CWC, supra note 97, art. 1(1).
132. Geneva Protocol, supra note 129.
133. Ottawa Treaty, supra note 129, art. 1(1).
134. Such as the ban on expanding bullets and poisoned weapons in the Hague Convention of 1907, and
the use of weapons that produce fragments undetectable by X-rays such as plastic landmines, the use
of incendiaries against civilians, and the use of blinding laser weapons in the Conventional Weapons
Treaty of 1980 and its 1995 Protocol. Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land,
Oct 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539, available at
http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/1907c.htm [hereinafter Hague Convention of 1907];
Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May
be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Protocols III-IV, Oct 10,
1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 137, 19 I.L.M. 1523 [hereinafter Conventional Weapons Convention].
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would be contradictory. However, the NPT should be modified to include a provision pro-
hibiting all Parties from being the first to use a nuclear weapon in a conflict, and to prohibit
use of nuclear weapons against any NNWS Party.
A "no first use" provision would require some NWS Parties to change their current mili-
tary doctrine. U.K. defense policy now reserves the right to use nuclear weapons "in ex-
treme self defence."13S In the United States, the Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations envi-
sions a variety of conditions in which the U.S. would be the first to employ nuclear
weapons, including to prevent an imminent chemical or biological weapons attack, destroy
a hardened bunker, or to counter potentially overwhelming adversary conventional
forces.136 Russia made a pledge against first use of nuclear weapons in 1982, but this
pledge was officially dropped in 1993.131 France has also recently implied that they would
be willing to respond to terrorist attacks with nuclear weapons.s3 8
However, the nuclear powers have not been completely closed to the idea of adopting a
"no first use" policy. In a 1995 UNSC Resolution, all five NWS Parties gave security assur-
ances against the use of nuclear weapons against NNWS Parties.139 China and India have
both publicly declared their commitment to "no first use."140 In 2008, Pakistan's President
Asif Ali Zardari stated, "I can assure you that Pakistan will not be the first country ever to
use [nuclear weapons]."141 Several regional nuclear weapons free zone treaties also have a
"no first use" provision. For example, Protocol II, Article 3 of the Treaty of Tlateloco states,
"The governments ... undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the
Contracting Parties of the Treaty ... "142 Similar language can be found in Protocol I of the
Treaty of Pelindaba,143 Protocol 1, Article 2 of the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear
Weapon-Free Zone,144 and Protocol II, Article 1 of the Treaty of Rarotonga.145 The fact that
some NWS Parties have been willing to ratify these regional treaties (such as the U.S. with
135. UK Restates Nuclear Threat, BBC NEWS, Feb. 2, 2003,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk-news/politics/2717939.stm.
136. JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, supra note 44, ch. 3(1)(d).
137. Serge Schmemann, Russia Drops Pledge of No First Use of Atom Arms, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1993, at A8,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/1993/11/04/world/russia-drops-pledge-of-no-first-use-of-
atom-arms.html?n=Top/Reference/Times%20Topics/Subjects/l/International%2Relations.
138. France 'would use nuclear arms,' BBC NEWS, Jan. 19, 2006,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4627862.stm.
139. S.C. Res. 1737, U.N. Doc. S/Res/984 (Apr. 11, 1995), available at
http://www.nti.org/db/china/engdocs/unsc984.htm.
140. BRUCE D. LARKIN, NUCLEAR DESIGNS 145 (1996) (citing Qiao Guanha, Speech to the U.N. General
Assembly (Nov. 19, 1871)); Ministry of External Affairs, Draft Report of National Security Advisory
Board on Indian Nuclear Doctrine art. 2.4, Aug. 17, 1999 (India), available at
http://mea.gov.in/mystartphp?id=51515763.
141. Myra MacDonald, Zardari Says Ready to Commit to No First Use of Nuclear Weapons, REUTERS (Nov. 22,
2008), http://blogs.reuters.com/pakistan/2008/11/22/zardari-says-ready-to-commit-to-no-first-
use-of-nuclear-weapons/.
142. Additional Protocol II to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, Apr. 1,
1968, 22 U.S.T. 754, 634 U.N.T.S. 762.
143. Additional Protocol I to the African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty, June 23, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 698.
144. Additional Protocol I to the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone, Dec. 15, 1995,
35 I.L.M. 635.
145. Additional Protocol 11 to the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty, Aug. 6, 1985, 24 I.L.M. 1442,
available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/inf331.shtml
[hereinafter Treaty of Rarotonga].
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the Treaty of Tlateloco) implies that they may be willing to add a "no first use" provision to
the NPT.
Adopting a "no first use" provision is important because it can end the cascade of nuc-
lear deterrence. Arguably, the U.S.S.R. developed nuclear weapons to counter the perceived
threat from the United States. The U.K., France, and China developed nuclear weapons to
counter the perceived threat from the U.S.S.R. India developed nuclear weapons to counter
the perceived Chinese threat. Pakistan developed nuclear weapons to counter the per-
ceived Indian threat. Even today, North Korea argues that they need nuclear weapons as a
deterrent against a nuclear preemptive attack from an enemy.146 Iran too seeks nuclear
weapons as a shield against perceived Weapons of Mass Destruction threats from Israel,
the United States and Iraq.147
A "no first use" provision would help to alleviate the concerns of potential nuclear pow-
ers that they need nuclear weapons to deter an enemy from launching a nuclear attack
against them. A security guarantee that helps to assure countries that they will not be the
target of a nuclear attack can help break the cascade of nuclear deterrence, and would be
an achievable intermediate goal on the path of complete nuclear disarmament.
C. Design a Regime with Mandatory Sanctions Against Countries that Choose not to
Sign the Treaty
The NPT does not provide for any consequences of non-accession. There is also current-
ly no mechanism within the NPT to deter non-accession or non-compliance other than the
threat of bad publicity and the disapproval of the world community. Countries who do not
feel that the NPT is in their best interest simply choose to not sign and not be bound by its
provisions. As of 2010, four countries are non-Parties to the NPT.148 These countries made
a political decision that they did not want to be bound by the NPT's restrictions, and
wanted to maintain the option of developing a nuclear weapons capability. As non-Parties,
they are not bound by any of the restrictions of the NPT and are free to develop nuclear ca-
pacity at will.
The NPT as currently written is powerless to prevent non-Parties from developing nuc-
lear weapons capability. There are only limited downsides to declining to become a Party.
Article I of the NPT forbids NWS Parties from directly providing nuclear weapons technol-
ogy to "any recipient whatsoever," with no distinction between NNWS Parties and non-
146. Lee Sang Yong, North Korea Will Strengthen Nuclear Deterrent, DAILY NK, Apr. 20, 2009,
http://dailynk.com/english/read.php?catald=nk01700&num=4820.
147. See Arch Roberts Jr., Why Iran Seeks Nuclear Weapons, YALE GLOBAL ONLINE (Jan. 8, 2009),
http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/why-iran-seeks-nuclear-weapons.
148. The four non-Parties are India, Israel, Pakistan and North Korea. Signatories and Parties to the Treaty
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/treaties/npt3.html (last accessed Apr. 15, 2011). India,
Pakistan and North Korea have openly tested and declared that they possess nuclear weapons.
Nuclear Weapons: Who has What at a Glance, ARMS CONTROL ASS'N,
http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Nuclearweaponswhohaswhat (last accessed June 26, 2011).
Israel has had a policy of opacity regarding its own nuclear weapons program. Id. North Korea
originally acceded but has since withdrawn. N Korea Withdraws from Nuclear Pact, supra note 66.
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signatories. 149 Article 111(2) forbids Parties from providing special nuclear material to
NNWS Parties, but makes no mention of whether such materials can be provided to non-
signatories. 50 While the world generally complies with the spirit of the NPT and refuses to
provide materials to non-signatories, this compliance is voluntary and is discarded when
leaders decide to give national interests more weight than international agreements.' 1s Ar-
ticles IV(2) and V encourage Parties to share nuclear technology, but do not specify that
such technologies are not to be shared with non-signatories.sz The guidelines of the Nuc-
lear Suppliers Group (NSG) attempt to fill this gap, but the NSG guidelines do not carry the
same weight of international law that a treaty would have, and loopholes in the guidelines
still permit transfer of technology in some cases.15 3 While generally effective at stopping
trade, the guidelines are fungible and can be changed to suit the needs of countries with
the power to change the system in their favor. For example, in 2006, the United States
forced through a change in the NSG guidelines to successfully get a waiver to transfer pre-
viously prohibited items to India.154
This failure to address non-signatories is a major flaw in the NPT because it creates a
situation where the only countries being bound by its provisions are those that have al-
ready made the political decision to not develop nuclear weapons. By contrast, the Mon-
treal Protocol lays out very specific penalties for non-compliance and for non-participation.
Article 4 of the Montreal Protocol provides for specific restrictions on trade with non-
Parties. Parties to the Montreal Protocol are not permitted to import or export most clorof-
luorocarbons (CFCs), or products containing CFCs, from countries that are not Parties.155
Parties are also forbidden to provide non-Parties with technology or financial assistance
for projects that produce or use CFCs.1s6 Article 8 of the Montreal Protocol sets up a me-
chanism for treatment of Parties found to be in non-compliance. 5 7 Under Article 8, the Par-
ties have authorized the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) to establish an
Ozone Secretariat to regularly meet to investigate non-compliance and recommend penal-
ties.158 Penalties can be as severe as treating non-compliant Parties as if they were non-
149. NPT, supra note 1, art. I.
150. Id. art. Ill § 2.
151. See, e.g., Text of U.S. NSG Proposal on India, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT'L PEACE,
http://www.carnegieendowmentorg/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=203 8 8&prog=zgp&proj=z
npp (last accessed Apr. 15, 2011).
152. NPT, supra note 1, arts. IV § 2, V.
153. The guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group require that members refrain from transferring trigger
list items to countries without full IAEA safeguards (including non-signatories to the NPT). IAEA,
Communication Received from Certain Member States Regarding Guidelines for the Export of Nuclear
Material, Equipment, and Technology, at 2, IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/254/Rev.8/Part 1 (March 20, 2006),
available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2006/infcirc254r8pl.pdf.
However, technology that is not on the trigger list is not prohibited, and there is a loophole in
paragraph 4(b) allowing for transfer of trigger items in "exceptional cases." Id
154. Text of U.S. NSG Proposal on India, supra note 151.
155. Montreal Protocol, supra note 62, art. 4(1)-(3). See also CWC, supra note 97, art. I (obligating parties
to not "assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State
Party under this Convention").
156. Montreal Protocol, supra note 62, at art 4(5)-(6).
157. Id. art. 8.
158. Reports of the Implementation Committee Under the Non-Compliance Procedure for the Montreal
Protocol, UN ENv'T PROGRAMME OZONE SECRETARIAT,
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Parties under Article 4.159
The Montreal Protocol provides an economic 'stick' that can be used to deter countries
from remaining outside of the Treaty. This deterrence language should be adopted by the
NPT, and the treaty should be amended to explicitly restrict Parties from importing or ex-
porting certain products and technologies to non-Parties. For example, an amended NPT
could require a complete embargo of all nuclear technology, including commercial nuclear
power technology and financing of nuclear projects to non-signatories. Nuclear power is
big business, especially for India. For example, after the NSG guidelines were modified to
allow trade with India, India signed a nuclear fuel deal with Russia for $700 million.160 Pa-
kistan is currently constructing the Chasma-2 nuclear power reactor with $350 million in
financing from China.161 Were the NPT modified to absolutely forbid nuclear trade with
non-signatories, large economic interests could persuade non-signatories to join the NPT.
It could go even further. Considering that nuclear energy is not a large industry in many
countries, the loss of access to nuclear power technology may not be a big enough stick.
This provision should be expanded to cover all energy products and technology. This
would include embargoes on the import and export of oil and gasoline. In addition, Parties
should be restricted from providing financial assistance to non-signatories for domestic
energy projects.
Like the Montreal Protocol, these restrictions could be applied in stages to allow non-
Parties time to adjust and come into compliance with the treaty.162 In addition, similar to
Article 4 of the Montreal Protocol, as part of the implementation of this new provision, Par-
ties should approve sanctions for non-compliance to include treating the non-complying
Party as a non-Party. This would discourage countries such as North Korea from becoming
Parties to the NPT and yet not complying with its provisions.
By taking these actions, the NPT will have a large economic 'stick' that can be used to
encourage countries to become Parties, and to enforce compliance once they do.' 6' When
combined with the earlier recommendation to require all countries to submit to eventual
complete disarmament, this will address the concerns of some countries that they refuse to
be subject to restrictions while other countries are not subject to similar restrictions.
http://ozone.unep.org/Meeting-Documents/impcom/impcom-reports-index.html (last accessed Apr.
6, 2011).
159. See, e.g., U.N. Env't Programme, Decision XIII/16: Potential non-compliance with the freeze on CFC
consumption in Article 5 Parties in the control period 1999-2000, U.N. Doc. UNEP/OzL.Pro/13/10
(2006), available at
http://ozone.unep.org/Publications/MPHandbook/Section_2_Decisions/Article_8/decs-
potential-non-compliance/Decision_XIll-16.shtml.
160. Russia, India Sign 700 Million Dollars in Nuclear Fuel Deals, INDIA DEFENCE, Feb 11, 2009,
http://www.india-defence.com/reports-4216
161. Nuclear Power in Pakistan, WORLD NUCLEAR Ass'N, http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/infl08.html
(last accessed Apr. 15, 2011).
162. Montreal Protocol, supra note 62, art. 4.
163. Admittedly, there will not be 100% compliance, especially when countries are asked to impose
sanctions on their traditional allies. However, even partial compliance could have an effect on a
country's decision to remain outside of the NPT and could provide domestic political pressure on a
country to encourage their non-signatory ally to join.
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D. Design a Regime that Encourages Compliance and Discourages Withdrawalfrom
the Treaty
Similarly, the NPT should ideally be amended to discourage countries from withdrawing
from the Treaty or being non-compliant with the Treaty. The toothlessness of the current
NPT was recently seen in the response to the situation in North Korea. In late 2002 and
early 2003, the IAEA issued two resolutions stating that North Korea was in non-
compliance with their obligations under the NPT.164 When the IAEA threatened to send the
matter to the UN Security Council, North Korea simply dropped out of the NPT. 16S
Article X of the NPT provides a sovereign right to withdraw from the treaty. 166 However,
nothing in the NPT provides for consequences for withdrawal. The only possible response
for the rest of the world is to refer the action to the UNSC, citing the withdrawal as a "threat
to the peace."1 67 However, the UNSC is not required to take actions against the withdraw-
ing Party, and sanctions may be vetoed if the Party has an ally on the UNSC. 168 A clause
within the NPT that automatically imposed trade sanctions on a withdrawing Party with-
out requiring separate U.N. action would make the consequences of withdrawal more
clearly defined to the withdrawing Party and remove hope that they could avoid negative
consequences if the UNSC lacks the political will (or the votes) to impose a penalty.
As it now stands, the NPT has no inherent ability to encourage compliance or discourage
withdrawal. Any country that signs can, with little effort, withdraw from the NPT and begin
a nuclear weapons development program. In fact, a country could sign, accept support for
their nuclear infrastructure as provided for in Article IV, and once they have reached a cer-
tain level of proficiency, abruptly drop out of the NPT and repurpose their commercial nuc-
lear industry to weapons development.
Ideally, the NPT should be strengthened by removing the option for Parties to withdraw.
However, this is too ambitious of a goal. Almost all other arms control treaties have provi-
sions similar to Article X of the NPT.169 However, Article X could be modified to restrict or
condition withdrawal. For example, in the 2005 NPT Review Conference, Germany sug-
gested adding a clause to Article X, which stated "the right of withdrawal cannot be exer-
cised in cases where the state in question is ... in noncompliance with the NPT."170 This
164. IAEA Resolution on North Korea Oan. 6, 2003), available at http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-
issues/nuclear-weapons/issues/proliferation/north-koreaiaea-resolution-north-korea_2003-01-
06.htm
165. Text of North Korea's Statement on NPT Withdrawal, N. KOREAN NEWS AGENCY, Jan. 10, 2003,
http://www.atomicarchive.com/Docs/Deterrence/DPRKNPTstatement.shtml.
166. NPT, supra note 1, art. X.
167. See U.N. Charter arts. 39, 41-42.
168. See, e.g., FARRALL, supra note 70, at 213.
169. See, e.g., CWC, supra note 97, art. XVI; Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production,
and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and their Destruction art. XVIII,
Apr. 10, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 583, 1015 U.N.T.S. 163, available at http://unhq-appspub-
01.un.org/UNODA/TreatyStatus.nsf/44e6eeabc9436b78852568770078d9cG/ffa7842e7fd1d00 785 2
5688f0070b82d [hereinafter BWC].
170. Preparatory Comm. for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Strengthening the NPT Against Withdrawal and Non-Compliance:
Suggestions for the Establishment of Procedures and Mechanisms, U.N. Doc.
NPT/CONF.2005/PC.1ll/WP.15 (Apr. 29, 2004), available at
http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/prepcom04/papers/GermanyWP15.pdf.
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clause would limit the ability of countries like North Korea from withdrawing from the
treaty to avoid sanctions for being non-compliant.
The language of the CWC provides for another potential way to strengthen the NPT. Ar-
ticle XVI(3) of the CWC notes that withdrawal from the treaty does not affect the duty of
States to continue fulfilling their obligations under international law.171 If NWS Parties
make significant steps towards disarmament, customary international law outlawing the
possession or development of nuclear weapons will be created. If this is the case, then add-
ing a clause to the NPT warning Parties that withdrawal does not exempt them from meet-
ing customary international law will provide a hook to prevent countries such as North Ko-
rea from withdrawing from the NPT and subsequently claiming that they are under no
obligation to refrain from nuclear weapons development.
Further, the NPT should be modified to include an article similar to Articles VI and VII of
the BWC. Article VI(1) authorizes any State Party to lodge a complaint to the UNSC if they
find any other State Party is in breach of their obligations.172 Article VI(2) requires all State
Parties to cooperate in carrying out an investigation by the UNSC.1 73 Article VII requires
State Parties to provide support and assistance to any Party that has been exposed to dan-
ger as a result of a violation of the BWC.174 Adding this language to the NPT will strengthen
compliance in two ways. First, it will lessen the chance that a country could count on po-
werful allies to shield it from an investigation into their compliance. Second, it will alert
countries that if they threaten their neighbors, all of the Parties to the NPT will be bound to
protect any injured Parties. This makes the idea of having a clandestine weapons develop-
ment program or using weapons in an offensive manner less palatable, even to non-
signatories of the NPT.
In addition, similar to the language contained in Article XII of the CWC, the language of
Article X should be strengthened by stating that withdrawal from the NPT will create a
presumption of a threat to international peace.175 Instead of simply requiring that with-
drawing countries file their reasons for withdrawal, it should be noted in the NPT that
withdrawal will automatically be referred to the UNSC as a "threat to the peace."176 Admit-
tedly, as stated above, this will not have any guaranteed effect (since the UNSC could
choose to take no action), but it would encourage the UNSC to publicly debate the issue,
and would increase the chance that serious actions-potentially military actions-would
be taken in response.'"7 This change would provide one more disincentive to countries
considering whether withdrawing from the treaty is in their national interests.
171. CWC, supra note 97, art. XVIII(3).
172. BWC, supra note 169, art. VI(1).
173. Id. art. VI(2).
174. Id. art. VII.
175. CWC, supra note 97, art XII(4).
176. Article 39 of the U.N. Charter gives the UNSC the authority to determine whether there has been a
breach of the peace. U.N. Charter art. 39. Articles 41 and 42 give the UNSC the authority to take
actions to restore international peace and security. U.N. Charter arts. 41-42.
177. See generally Mohamed El-Baradei, Saving Ourselves From Self Destruction, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 12, 2004,
at A37, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/02/12/opinion/saving-ourselves-from-self-
destruction.html.
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E. Develop Equitable Solutions to Solve Problems with Dual-Use Technology.
The NPT was initially designed to be a deal whereby countries agreed to forgo their so-
vereign right to develop nuclear weapons in exchange for the promise of assistance with
nuclear energy projects.178 This promise has not been fulfilled, in part because of suspi-
cions about countries using commercial nuclear energy research as a cover for a nuclear
development program. Certainly this is the strategy taken by North Korea. In 1965, North
Korea completed construction of an 8 MWe reactor at Yongbyon. 179 After North Korea
joined the NPT as a NNWS Party in 1985, they maintained that the Yongbyon reactor was
being used for nuclear power generation and its operation was therefore allowed under
Article IV of the NPT. However, by 1993, IAEA inspection teams had concluded that North
Korean scientists were secretly using the reactor to generate weapons-grade plutonium, in
violation of North Korea's commitments under the NPT. 180
The situation in North Korea highlights one of the key deficiencies in the NPT. Countries
such as North Korea can demand their sovereign right to possess nuclear technology pur-
suant to Article IV, yet secretly use that same technology as part of a nuclear weapons pro-
gram. The Yongbyon reactor did indeed produce power, and was also useful in legitimate
scientific research. However, it also generated weapons-grade plutonium, and North Korea
used Yongbyon to produce forty kilograms of it-enough to create several nuclear wea-
pons.181
A similar situation is currently ongoing with Iran. Iran is a NNWS Party to the NPT, and
as such claims a sovereign right to develop nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, a
right affirmed by Article IV of the NPT.182 Iran is developing a domestic gas centrifuge
technology capability to enrich uranium. Iran claims that this technology will only be used
to enrich uranium to low levels for use as nuclear fuel.183 However, the same gas centrifuge
technology can also be used to enrich uranium to high enrichment levels suitable for use in
a nuclear weapon. 184 Because of this danger, the United States and other countries have
taken steps to deny this technology to Iran.185 In response, Iranian officials have widely and
loudly complained that they have an "inalienable right" to produce nuclear fuel, and have
continued their efforts.18 6 Since the technology is the same, Iran is able to assert the guar-
antees of Article IV to develop a commercial enrichment program. From there, it is only a
178. See NPT, supra note 1, art. IV.
179. Research Reactor Database Web Site, IAEA,
http://nucleus.iaea.org/RRDB/RR/ReactorSearch.aspx?rf=1 (last accessed Apr. 6, 2011).
180. SARAH J. DIEHL & JAMES CLAY MOLTZ, NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND NONPROLIFERATION 192 (2002).
181. North Korea Claims to Have Weaponized Plutonium, CNN, Jan. 18, 2009,
http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/asiapcf/01/17/korea.nuclear/.
182. Iran Demands its Nuclear Rights, BBC NEWs, Sept 18, 2005,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4255976.stm
183. Nasser Karmi, Iran Says it is now Running 3,000 Uranium Centrifuges, WASH. POST, Sept 3, 2007, at
A12, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/09/02/AR2007090200415.html.
184. Id.
185. See Dombey, Daniel and David Blair, US and EU Step Up Iran Nuclear Sanctions Drive, FIN. TIMES, May
24,2011.
186. Iran Demands Its Nuclear Rights, supra note 182; Iran Defiant on Right to Nuclear Power, CNN, July 5,
2008, http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/meast/07/05/iran.nuclear/index.htmi.
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small leap to repurpose this program to nuclear weapons development.
The drafters of the NPT attempted to address this dual-use problem in Article III. Article
Ill requires that all NNWS Parties accept safeguards negotiated with the IAEA.187 However,
for several reasons this is inequitable and insufficient for addressing the dual-use problem.
First, Article Ill is contradictory to the broad sovereign right to develop nuclear technology
proclaimed in Article IV. Article 111(3) requires that safeguards must be designed to comply
with Article IV.188 However, since Article IV is vaguely and broadly worded, NNWS Parties
are free to argue that almost any technologies are allowed.18 9 Second, because the specifics
of safeguards are not spelled out in the treaty text, Parties are required to sign away some
of the sovereign rights asserted in Article IV without being sure of what exactly they are
agreeing to. This can create tension as Parties later find they are being criticized for devel-
oping technology they believed was allowable. Third, while a model safeguards agreement
exists, each individual country must negotiate a separate safeguards agreement with the
IAEA. 190 This can lead to politicization of the safeguards process and inequity as some
countries can end up with stricter safeguards than others.
A potential solution to this dilemma may be found in other arms control treaties, most
notably the CWC. Unlike the NPT, the CWC recognizes the dual-use problem that the same
chemicals and processing equipment used for producing chemical weapons can also be
used for legitimate high-value commercial purposes. Unlike the NPT, which offers a blanket
right of NNWS Parties to develop any nuclear technology, Article VI of the CWC expressly
addresses which chemical activities are not prohibited under the convention. 191 Article VI
creates several categories ("schedules") of chemicals, based on that particular chemical's
applicability to the production of chemical agents.192 Each schedule is subject to different
restrictions, which are explained in great detail in the Verification Annex.193 Essentially, the
CWC creates a transparent sliding scale whereby technologies and chemicals of highest
proliferation concern are subject to significant restrictions and intrusive verification me-
thods, while technologies and chemicals of lower proliferation concern are subject to lesser
restrictions.
This issue has been addressed in at least one bilateral agreement. In 1994, the United
States and North Korea signed a joint agreement with the goal of replacing the Yongbyon
reactor with a new light-water reactor. 194 Unlike the Yongbyon reactor, this new light-
water reactor was not capable of producing weapons-grade plutonium, and thus did not
present the same proliferation concerns.195 While the deal was never completed, it does
187. NPT, supra note 1, art. Ill.
188. Id. art. Ill § 3.
189. For example, Iran has argued that they have a sovereign right to uranium enrichment centrifuges
under Article IV. Iran Demands Its Nuclear Rights, supra note 182.
190. See Model Safeguards Agreement, supra note 121.
191. CWC, supra note 97.
192. Id.
193. Id at Verification Annex.
194. Agreed Framework Between the United States of America and the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea, U.S.-N. Kor., Oct. 21 1994, 34 I.L.M. 603, available at
www.kedo.org/pdfs/AgreedFramework.pdf.
195. North Korea Claims to Have Weaponized Plutonium, supra note 181.
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provide evidence that a sliding scale of nuclear technology can be an effective tool in merg-
ing the non-proliferation goals of the NPT with its technology sharing provisions.
The NPT should be modified to create a similar regime to the CWC. Based on scientific
data, various technologies and materials that are dual-use should be arranged into catego-
ries. Technologies and materials most applicable to nuclear weapons development should
be subjected to significant restrictions and intrusive inspections, while those technologies
and materials less applicable to nuclear weapons development will be subject to fewer re-
strictions. Much of this data already exists in the IAEA Model Safeguards agreement.196 It
would be a simple matter to adopt the Safeguards Agreement as a Protocol or Annex to the
NPT. This would improve equity and transparency in the safeguards process.
This modification will lessen proliferation concerns because countries such as North
Korea or Iran would be unable to legitimately claim a right to develop dual-use technology,
or that the IAEA is treating them unfairly. Under this proposal, the old "atoms for peace"
deal would be replaced with one that is more equitable, transparent, and effective. For ex-
ample, under this new system, a Party would be free to legitimately develop its light-water
reactor (such as Iran's Bushehr facility) without interference, in exchange for accepting in-
trusive inspections at its uranium enrichment facility (such as Iran's Natanz facility), and
foregoing the right to develop plutonium production reactors (such as North Korea's
Yongbyon reactor). This system is better than the present system because it creates clear
guidance to Parties on their rights and obligations. The present system relies on diplomatic
negotiations and political in-fighting, and often results in disagreements between Parties
over what technologies are and are not allowed.
X. Obstacles to Passage of an Updated Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty
As participants in the NPT's Seventh Review Conference found, there are a number of
obstacles standing in the way of amending the NPT. These obstacles must be overcome be-
fore meaningful change to the NPT can occur.
The main obstacle to the reform of the NPT is position of the five NWS Parties, who ap-
pear unwilling to negotiate an end to the two-tiered system of NWS and NNWS Parties.
Nuclear weapons are a very powerful instrument of state power, and it is understandable
that the NWS Parties are reluctant to lose them. This makes NWS Parties the most likely to
block serious attempts to modify the NPT. These parties also happen to have all the UNSC
vetoes and wield significant economic power that can be used to bully smaller countries. It
is likely that attempts to significantly modify the NPT without the buy-in of the NWS Par-
ties is not possible since Article VIII of the NPT gives all NWS Parties a veto over proposed
amendments.19 7
A second obstacle to reform of the NPT is the lobbying efforts of non-governmental
groups. If the changes suggested in Article IX are made, there is the potential for an in-
crease in nuclear energy production worldwide, including in countries with poor environ-
196. Model Safeguards Agreement, supra note 121.
197. NPT, supra note 1, art. VIll § 2.
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mental records and limited abilities to enforce domestic environmental laws. This could
cause environmental groups to oppose reform.198 In addition, business interests that stand
to lose market share as nuclear power generation increases (such as oil and gas compa-
nies), and those who stand to lose markets if sanctions become more stringent (such as
nuclear reactor suppliers), could also lobby against reform. If non-governmental interests
rally against the changes, it could place domestic political pressure on countries to not
modify the NPT.
The mandatory sanctions regime suggested above may also cause some countries to
balk. Countries may not want to be forced to press sanctions against large trading partners
or allies, and would reject the idea of mandatory sanctions. For example, Russia would be
unlikely to vote for a regime that would require mandatory sanctions against Iran, and the
United States would be unlikely to vote for a regime that requires mandatory sanctions
against Israel. If countries feel their economic or political interests could be threatened,
they may chose to not back the NPT modifications.
The main purpose of the NPT is to prevent proliferation. But, like all treaties it is limited
by the general tenets of international law. Some leaders have less than rational decision-
making processes, and there may not be anything that can be done to dissuade them from
developing weapons capability, so even a more robust NPT would not stop them. Argu-
ments can be made that a tighter NPT would make it more politically and economically
costly to countries that decided to develop a nuclear weapons program, but in the end
countries may not see the value in updating the NPT if they feel it is unlikely to be more ef-
fective than the current version.
Similarly, non-state actors are not subject to treaty requirements, so even a more robust
NPT might not be able to deter them. Non-state actors are unaffected by trade sanctions
and so are unlikely to be dissuaded by a more robust NPT. An argument can be made that
reducing the amount of special nuclear material in the world would make it more difficult
for non-state actors to acquire materials. But again, countries may not see the value in up-
dating the NPT if they feel it is unlikely to be more effective than the current version.
Finally, some countries feel that they need the option of developing nuclear weapons for
defensive security purposes. Nuclear weapons are a significant force multiplier and a rea-
sonably effective deterrent. It is possible that some countries, such as Pakistan or Israel,
would continue to reject the NPT on the basis that they require nuclear weapons for their
own security needs. It is unlikely that security guarantees will assuage their fears, and they
may lobby against a more robust NPT that would make it more difficult for them to main-
tain their nuclear weapons programs.
198. Admittedly, in recent years concern over greenhouse gas emissions has caused some environmental
groups to reconsider the benefits of nuclear power. See, e.g. Barringer, Felicity, Old Foes Soften to New
Reactors, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/15/national/15nuke.html
However, at present most environmental groups would still be opposed to encouraging the
development of nuclear power. See, e.g., End the Nuclear Age, GREENPEACE INT'L,
http://www.greenpeace.org/international/campaigns/nuclear (last accessed Apr. 15, 2011).
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XI. Can it be Done?
The NPT has been in force for around forty years without significant modification. The
changes suggested in this paper are radical, and the obstacles significant. However, it may
still be possible to overcome these obstacles and accomplish the changes.
Article VillI of the NPT allows for amendments to be made. Any Party may propose an
amendment to the Treaty.199 If one-third of the Parties agree, a conference is convened to
consider the amendment. 200 Amendments must be approved by a majority vote of all par-
ties, but only if all five NWS Parties and all members with seats on the Board of Governors
of the IAEA also agree to the amendment. 201 This presents a high hurdle, but one that can
be potentially overcome, even though to date the treaty text has never been amended. 202
The main driver behind the original passage of the NPT was the United States and the
other NWS Parties. However, the modifications suggested in this paper would not have to
originate in the same place. A grass roots effort started by smaller countries or even pri-
vate citizens could be effective at getting the ball rolling. A good example how this could
work would be the recent Ottawa Treaty.203 This treaty, banning the use of landmines, was
initially a grass roots effort started by a non-governmental organization called the Interna-
tional Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL). 204 The treaty was actively opposed by some of
the biggest users of landmines including the United States.205 Despite this opposition, the
Ottawa Treaty has entered into force and has now been ratified by 156 countries.206 The
success of the Ottawa Treaty shows that a major arms control treaty can be enacted with-
out the sponsorship of one or more of the major stockpilers of those arms. While the Otta-
wa treaty has not been ratified by China, Russia, or the United States (all of whom have a
veto on the U.N. Security Council), the treaty is considered a major step in the end of land-
mine production and use.
The ultimate goal of the suggestions made in this paper is to strengthen the NPT and re-
duce or eliminate the stockpiles of all of the countries currently in possession of nuclear
weapons. Admittedly, it is unlikely that, in the short term, this updated regime will have
complete accession. The NWS Parties will likely balk at giving up their nuclear capability in
the short term, and other non-parties will continue to refuse to accede for various reasons.
However, this does not mean that the world community should not make an effort to im-
prove the NPT. Sometimes a treaty is an important symbolic step, even without complete
accession. A stronger NPT, with hard deadlines on NWS Parties to disarm, will send a mes-
199. NPT, supra note 1, art. VllI § 1.
200. Id.
201. Id. art. VIlI § 2.
202. Norman Dombey, The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 52 NEW LEFT REv. 39, 54 (July-Aug. 2008),
available at http://www.newleftreview.org/A2732.
203. Ottawa Treaty, supra note 129.
204. Chronology of the ICBL and the Ban Movement, INT'L CAMPAIGN TO BAN LANDMINES,
http://www.icbl.org/campaign/history/chronology (last accessed Apr. 6, 2011).
205. See Barry Schweid, U.S. Won't Sign Anti-Land Mine Treaty, WASH. POST, Feb. 26, 2004,
http://www.washingtonpostcom/wp-dyn/articles/A10233-2004Feb26.html.
206. States Parties, INT'L CAMPAIGN TO BAN LANDMINEs, http://www.icbl.org/treaty/members (last accessed
Apr. 6, 2011).
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sage that it is no longer acceptable for countries to possess nuclear weapons. As it present-
ly stands, many nuclear aspirants such as Iran and North Korea look around and declare
that if other countries are allowed to have weapons, they should be allowed to have them
to. Similarly, the gravitas a country like the United States might have in dissuading an aspi-
rant from nuclear weapons development is lessened by the fact that the United States
maintains its own nuclear stockpile.
An updated NPT, even without complete accession, will have the effect of changing
people's perceptions of the issue. For example, prior to the Ottawa Treaty, most countries
and most people did not recognize the threat of landmines, nor saw them as a particularly
insidious form of weapon. As the ICBL and other NGOs began to raise public awareness of
the issue, and more and more countries signed on to the Ottawa Treaty, the use of land-
mines became less and less acceptable, even by those like the United States who have cho-
sen to remain outside the treaty. While the United States still remains outside of the Otta-
wa Treaty, it has made efforts to reduce the number of landmines in its stockpile and to
redesign its landmines to reduce the threat of civilian casualties.207 As mentioned above,
even symbolic steps have the capability of creating customary international law, and as
more countries come into compliance with the Ottawa Treaty, it becomes more difficult for
those who do not comply to continue to assert a right to use weapons that the world com-
munity considers outside ofjus in bello.
Similarly, the Kyoto Protocol has not achieved complete accession. 208 In addition, many
of the Parties are unlikely to meet the CO2 reductions the Protocol holds them to.209 How-
ever, the Kyoto Protocol can be considered a success because it has changed public percep-
tion of the issue, and has made continued production of CO2 emissions less politically pa-
latable than it would otherwise be. A fundamental shift in the world's attitude towards CO2
emissions has occurred, and it is becoming more difficult for a country to assert a right to
emit unlimited CO2. Similarly, an updating and strengthening of the NPT can result in a
shift of public attitude towards the development of nuclear weapons, resulting in increased
domestic political pressure on government to not pursue the technology, even if there is
not complete accession to the treaty.
While it may not be possible to amend the NPT in the face of direct opposition of one or
more of the NWS Parties (due to their Article VIII(2) veto), there is nothing stopping NNWS
Parties from developing a completely separate treaty, based on the provisions of the NPT
and with the modifications suggested above. This new treaty would bypass the NWS Par-
ties' veto ability and allow for meaningful change to occur without the required unanimous
approval of the five NWS Parties. As above, this new treaty would have the effect of focus-
ing public debate and increasing public awareness of the nuclear weapon threat, even if its
207. U.S. Landmine Policy, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/t/pm/wra/cll735.htm (last accessed
Apr. 15, 2011).
208. By January 2009, only eighty-four countries had ratified the Kyoto Protocol, and only 63.7% of
worldwide carbon emissions are covered. Kyoto Protocol Status of Ratification, U.N. FRAMEWORK
CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE (Jan. 14, 2009),
http://unfccc.int/files/kyoto-protocol/status-of-ratification/application/pdf/kp-ratification.pdf.
209. Michael Szabo & Alister Doyle, Rich Nation Greenhouse Gas Emissions Rise in 2007, REUTERS (Apr. 23,
2009), http://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSLN465325.
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practical effects are limited without the accession of the NWS Parties.
If it turns out to not be possible to achieve world consensus on a revised NPT, it might
still be possible to achieve the goals in a piecemeal fashion. There are presently a number
of regional nuclear treaties currently in effect.2 10 Through the use of these treaties, coun-
tries that do not possess the influence to enact a global treaty can effect change in their re-
gion of the world. By interlocking these treaties, it may be possible to create de facto
change without having to overcome the obstacles of bringing a global treaty into force. For
example, the Treaty of Rarotonga creates a nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific. 21 1 Article
V of that treaty prevents the stationing of foreign nuclear weapons on the territory of the
Parties. 212 Article V also contains a (voluntary) clause suggesting that Parties can prevent
foreign naval vessels carrying nuclear weapons from transiting their territorial waters.213
If various regional nuclear treaties adopt similar provisions, there could be a de facto
worldwide effect. Nuclear Weapons States would find their ability to use their naval forces
diminished if they could not find countries willing to host nuclear-armed vessels. Similarly,
for example, regional treaties could be amended to require sanctions on countries that are
not Parties to the NPT. If enough regional organizations work together, they can have a
significant effect, without requiring a global treaty that must be enacted through the United
Nations.
Change can even occur via domestic legislation within individual counties. For example,
in 1987, New Zealand passed a domestic law prohibiting nuclear-armed naval vessels from
landing at New Zealand ports.214 Austria and Mongolia have gone further and declared
themselves nuclear weapon-free countries. 215 Domestic legislation can be used to mandate
sanctions or take other actions against proliferators or non-Parties to the NPT.216 If enough
domestic legislatures enact similar anti-nuclear weapon laws, they can have an aggregate
international effect, even in the absence of any formal international agreements.
XII. Conclusions
For its time, the NPT was a landmark treaty, and most certainly contained the spread of
nuclear weapons technology. However, the world has changed in the forty years since the
treaty was negotiated, and its provisions are not ideal to contain proliferation in the twen-
210. See supra nn. 142-45.
211. Treaty of Rarotonga, supra note 145.
212. Id. art. 5.
213. Id.
214. Section 10 of the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament, and Arms Control Act 1987 (N.Z.),
available at http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/1987/0086/latest/DLM115116.html.
215. Atomsperrgesetz [Federal Constitutional Act for a Nuclear-Free Austria] Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBL]
No. 165/A/1978 (Austria), available at
http://www.parlamentgv.at/PG/DE/XX/A/A_00165/pmh.shtml; Law of Mongolia on its nuclear-
weapon-free status (Jan. 5, 2010) (Mong.),
http://www.mfatgov.mn/index.php?view=article&catid=42%3A2009-12-20-21-54-
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ty-first century.
The NPT should therefore be amended in a number of ways. First, the NPT should be
amended to set deadlines and intermediate milestones for NWS Parties to completely dis-
arm and meet their pledge under Article VI. Second, the NPT should be amended to include
a "no first use" provision. Third, the NPT should be amended to provide a stronger eco-
nomic 'stick' to deter countries from remaining outside of the treaty. Fourth, the NPT
should be amended to discourage countries from being non-compliant with their treaty ob-
ligations or from abrogating the treaty entirely. Finally, the NPT should be amended to
create a sliding scale of technology to encourage the use of nuclear energy while discourag-
ing the proliferation of dual-use technologies that can easily be repurposed to a nuclear
weapons program.
-By making these changes to the structure of the NPT, the treaty will be more in line with
modern arms control agreements and will be more effective at its fundamental mission to
reduce the worldwide threat of nuclear weapons.
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